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The class action has many uses. The most compelling occurs
when someone inflicts a small harm on each member of a large group
of people. In such a case, anyone victim would have to spend more
money to hire a lawyer than he could recover by winning the lawsuit,
so he would not sue. The class action enables the claims of all the
individual victims to be aggregated, thereby spreading the lawsuit's
costs among all class members and creating a potential recovery that is
large enough to make the suit economically viable. Although each
individual who is harmed wins only a small amount, the public benefit
is substantial. The costs of the large public harm are borne by the
person or firm responsible for it, and incentives to commit future
transgressions are removed.
In this way, the class action provides for the private enforcement
of laws that are aimed at protecting the public. Yet it contains a risk: If
the named plaintiff loses in court, then all of the members of the class
have lost and cannot relitigate their claims. Some people who might
never even have known about the lawsuit and who certainly never par-
ticipated in it will suddenly find themselves denied access to the court
system, on the theory that they were already represented by the
named plaintiffs who litigated the action on their behalf.
Admittedly, it is common for one individual to represent others
in a lawsuit, but those represented typically appoint their representa-
tive or at least consent to the representation. This ordinary form of
representation entails an agency relationship: It is premised on the
theory that the representative is acting as the agent of those he repre-
sents. In the class action, however, there is no consensual tie between
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